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Review Essay
The Nature of Legal Interpretation: What
Jurists Can Learn about Legal Interpretation
from Linguistics and Philosophy
Brian G. Slocum (ed). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
2017. 288pp.

Triantafyllos (Tria) Gkouvas*
Brian G. Slocum’s The Nature of Legal Interpretation: What Jurists Can Learn about
Legal Interpretation from Linguistics and Philosophy is a formidable addition to an
evolving trend in analytical jurisprudence that invites insights from jurisprudentially
“extraneous” domains such as linguistics, philosophy of language and mind, metaethics
and philosophy of action. A praiseworthy feature of this trend is the importance it attaches
to keeping these insights as free as possible of prior translation in the occasionally cryptic
or unnecessarily insular language of analytical jurisprudence and legal doctrine. It is
precisely thanks to this feature that recent discussions on the relevance of linguistic
(semantic and pragmatic) facts as determinants of legal content display an impressive
command of explanatory concepts and methods including the most challenging task of
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locating different aspects of legal meaning occurring outside as well as across the near
side/far side spectrum of pragmatics.1
The Nature of Legal Interpretation is an editorial undertaking that merits
commendation for bringing a philosophically seasoned and linguistically refined eye to one
of legal philosophy’s most contested topics. An outstanding virtue of this collection is the
even-handed exposition of insights drawn from almost every legally (jurisprudentially and
doctrinally) crucial region in the figurative space that emerges from allowing three
dimensions of “interpretative relevance.” The first dimension captures the linguistic
spectrum flanked by logical and semantic typologies of abstract objects (meanings and
linguistic objects) on the one side and pragmatic typologies of specific events featuring the
intentional acts of speakers at times and places (utterances). The contributions of Brian
Slocum (“The Contribution of Linguistics to Legal Interpretation”), Kent Greenawalt
(“Philosophy of Language, Linguistics, and Possible Lessons about Originalism”) and
Lawrence Solan (“Linguistic Knowledge and Legal Interpretation”) locate, with
impressive acumen, the pitfalls of a “jurisprudentially unfiltered” application of this
general spectrum to the semantics and pragmatics of legal discourse.
The second dimension captures the doctrinal spectrum flanked by the epistemic
activity of ascertaining the contribution of a legal provision to the content of the law and
the constructive activity of creating law that takes over when a provision’s contribution to
the law is indeterminate or uncertain on an issue before the court.2 The contributions of
Karen Petroski (“The Strange Fate of Holmes’ Normal Speaker of English”), Lawrence
Solum (“Originalism, Hermeneutics, and the Fixation Thesis”) and Francis Mootz
(“Getting Over the Originalist Fixation”) apply a historical, methodological and
hermeneutical perspective respectively to bear on the normative, rather than simply factual,
possibility of judicial lawmaking.
The third dimension captures the jurisprudential spectrum flanked by the roles
that descriptive (linguistic, mental, social or cultural) and normative (moral, political and
legal3) considerations play in the determination of legal content. The contributions of Frank
Ravitch (“The Continued Relevance of Philosophical Hermeneutics in Legal Thought”),
Nicholas Allott and Benjamin Shaer (“Legal Speech and the Elements of Adjudication”),
Scott Soames (“Deferentialism, Living Originalism, and the Constitution”) and Gideon
Rosen (“Deferentialism and Adjudication”) approximate from different disciplinary angles
(hermeneutical, pragmatic, constitutional-doctrinal and metaphysical respectively) a
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currently trending idea about legal content that tends to acquire—at least among analytical
legal philosophers—the shell of a new minimal common ground. In its most abstract
rendition the idea is that, regardless of where exactly one chooses to locate the borderline,
there are many, several or select cases in judicial practice where descriptive facts about the
sayings and doings of legal officials will fail to autonomously determine their own bearing
on the content of the law at a given time and place.
In this brief general comment, I would like to take the liberty of flagging an issue
that, albeit orthogonal to the more particular themes addressed in this collection, provides
an illuminating background as to what might license the impression that disagreement
between legal scholars, philosophers and linguists over the nature of legal interpretation is
too shallow or “conceptual” to merit resolution as a distinct source of interdisciplinary
concern. The background I am concerned with regards the answerability of theories of legal
interpretation to the verdicts of metaphysical inquiry into the determinants of legal
content.4 Broadly construed, determinants of legal content are descriptive and, arguably,
normative facts about the sayings, doings and mental states of lawmaking officials in virtue
of which different sources of law (statutes, constitutions, appellate decisions,
administrative regulations) bear information or content about what the law requires,
permits or empowers someone to do.
The present collection does not skimp on arguments that convey a committed
viewpoint on this relationship. What is missing, nonetheless, is a “taxonomic primer,” so
to speak, that would enable the reader to decode the chapter-by-chapter succession of
profoundly diverse perspectives on how competing theories of legal interpretation map
onto their different metaphysical backgrounds. As I plan to show further downstream, an
overarching, taxonomic perspective that would facilitate the comprehension of the
interdisciplinary scope of this collection becomes available only if we ascend at a higher
level of abstraction where the elementary metaphysical question of what a legal interpreter
asks when she interprets the law is neither bracketed nor treated as settled. The nature of
this taxonomic perspective is distinctly metaphysical in the sense that it addresses head on
the question of how the epistemology of law—namely, the way in which we acquire
cognitive access to the legally relevant information conveyed by various sources of legal
content (textual, historical, psychological)—tracks the metaphysics of law—namely, the
explanation of how facts about the enactment of texts, the history of political and
interpretative practices and the communicative dimension of legislative discourse ground
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the existence of more fine-grained facts about general legal obligations and rights in a given
jurisdiction.
Before moving on, I should stress that I do not perceive nor purport to present the
lack of this “taxonomic primer” as a weakness to which the present collection is in any
sense answerable. My aim is to alert the reader to the depth of substantive metaphysical
disagreement implied by this ambitious collection of doctrinal (constitutional and
statutory), linguistic, historical and philosophical (analytical and hermeneutical)
perspectives on the nature of legal interpretation. Fortunately, the selection of topics
addressed by each contributor contains a sufficient amount of “metaphysical cues” which
I plan to “exploit” in the course of inferring the underlying pattern from which I plan to
derive my metaphysical-taxonomic suggestions towards the end of this essay. What I am
inclined to interpret as a metaphysically meaningful pattern that all featured essays appear
to instantiate in one way or another is a recurring alternation mainly between objectual and
agentive and, less frequently, effectual or impact-centered modes of describing the subject
matter of legal interpretation. By “modes” I mean nothing more sophisticated than ways of
talking about or expressing one’s viewpoint on what a legal interpreter is supposed to ask
when (s)he engages in the respective activity of interpreting the law.
As I plan to document with textual evidence, the basic question of legal
interpretation can be mirrored in three interrogative variants which the reader of this
collection will encounter in more or less explicit and/or distinct formulation, namely: (1)
what a legal text qua abstract object or artifact legally means or designates, (2) what a legal
actor (enactor, drafter etc) qua authority-bearing agent means and/or implicates by a given
enactment, and, (3) which normative states of affairs (legal obligations, rights, powers)
obtain as an effect of certain linguistic (and institutional) facts about the meanings of
certain texts and the utterances or speech acts of certain legal officials. Bracketing
variations in scope of application or emphasis, all three modes of talking about legal
interpretanda are used interchangeably across this collection of essays without their
authors signaling an intentional shift in their background metaphysical allegiances.
Moreover, the objectual and agentive modes are occasionally fused into a single conceptual
compound such as the “communicative content of a legal text”—as opposed to the
communicative content of a legislative event (utterance or speech act performed by a
legislative agent). This versatility of usage, I shall argue, should be resisted when and
because it suppresses the independent force of these modes of inquiry as guides for
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evaluating the scope and content of our disagreement about the nature of legal
interpretation.
Examples of the objectual mode abound in this collection both in a pure form or,
as I will show further below, in fusion with the agentive mode. Reasons of space prevent
me from reserving for each essay a separate documentation of the frequent use of this mode
of presenting the object of legal interpretation but a few evocative examples will suffice
for the bigger picture I venture to draw in this comment. Leaving aside stylistic variations,
the most lucid objectual references can be found in Brian Slocum’s frequent talk of “the
determinants of meaning of legal texts” (14), Lawrence Solan’s linguistic analysis of the
interpretative dilemmas that arise “when the application of a legal text is at stake” (68),
Frank Ravitch’s hermeneutical elaboration of how the interpretive “horizon” of a legal text
is determined by “the potential time lag and cultural shifts between the drafting of laws and
their application to a variety of fact scenarios” (90) and Karen Petroski’s defense of
fictional legal discourse as a way of prompting “judges to step back from their own
personal, prereflective understandings of the significance of legal texts” (118).
As opposed to the more extensive use of objectual expressions, explicit references
to the agentive nature of legal interpretation are mainly concentrated in two essays of this
collection. The most consistent use of the agentive mode of talking about legal
interpretation can be found in Nicholas Allot’s and Benjamin Shaer’s speech-act-theoretic
account of judicial deliberation (chapter 8). Quite interestingly, their agentive perspective
draws its argumentative force directly from the actions of judges as deliberators and only
derivatively from the actions or utterances of lawmaking officials. Allott’s and Shaer’s
argument rests on the hypothesis that judges “are called upon to do [emphasis added]
something: namely, to decide, on the basis of this [legislative] speech, which party wins
the dispute” (193–94). In this regard, judges are simultaneously “hearers” of legislative
utterances or actions and institutional “speakers” or agents who also “do things with words”
by making a decision that settles the relevance of legislative utterances for the dispute at
hand. Focusing on the relevance of legislative rather than judicial-deliberative action Scott
Soames also adopts a distinctly agentive perspective on the question of what legal
interpretation is about (chapter 9). He associates his deferentialist variant of originalism
with a moderately pragmatic, hence, agentive, claim about the determinants of original
content: “what is asserted,” he suggests, “by the use of a text is what the performance
commits the performers [emphasis added] to, which is what knowledgeable addressees
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who understand the linguistic meaning of the text and are familiar with the contextual
background reasonably take them to be committed to” (234).
Hybrid instances of an “objectual-cum-agentive” understanding of legal
interpretation can be found in the direct dialogue featured by Lawrence Solum’s and
Francis Mootz’s respective essays. Solum’s partial uptake of this fusion is evidenced by
his recurring reference to “the communicative content of the constitutional text” and “the
original meaning of the constitutional text” (130). These and other similar expressions are
used to spell out the content of originalism’s two core ideas, namely, the temporal fixation
of the original meaning of the constitutional text and the constraint this meaning imposes
on constitutional actors “when they engage in constitutional practice (paradigmatically,
deciding constitutional cases)” (132).5 In his dialogically responsive essay, Mootz
rehearses the basic features of Solum’s defense of the fixation thesis with a view to
showcasing, as he claims, its ontological rather than its normative dispensability. Mootz’s
hermeneutical argument is also based on a hybrid conception of how the objectual-textual
and agentive or reader-centered dimensions of meaning merge in the context of legal
interpretation. In this regard, textual interpretation is taken to be a dialogic encounter in
which the reader qua agent and the text qua object are at play. Mootz further complements
this suggestion with a common articulation of the hermeneutical tenet that “there is no
meaning of the text that exists independent of the interpreter’s hermeneutical activity”
(160).
Finally, and, perhaps, not surprisingly so, the effectual mode of presenting the
object of legal interpretation is almost exclusively prevalent in Gideon Rosen’s
metaphysically nuanced critique of Solum’s deferentialist theory. 6 With the exception of a
brief reference by Brian Slocum to Mark Greenberg’s prominent variant of the effectual
mode of explaining the task of legal interpretation (chapter 1, at 25), Gideon Rosen’s
challenge of Scott Soames’ deferentialist model of constitutional interpretation is the only
explicit endorsement of the implications of Greenberg’s understanding of legal
interpretation as the epistemic process of discovering the normative (moral) impact of
linguistic and institutional facts on legal-normative states of affairs (obligations, rights,
powers).7 Rosen defends the power of deferentially mistaken, yet institutionally “calcified”
past decisions to change the content of the law in the effectual sense of changing the legal
effect of prior legislative pronouncements. Concurring with Mark Greenberg’s relevant
critique of objectual and agentive conceptions of legal interpretation Rosen notes that the
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question of legal interpretation “is not a question about the meanings of words, or about
what some person said or meant when he used some words. It is a question about the legal
consequences [emphasis added] of a speech act” (242).
I am aware that the way I have framed this evasive triad of modes of presenting
the object of legal interpretation seems too ad hoc or even contrived. In the remainder of
this review essay I will inject some further context and premises which will dispel, I hope,
this worry. As I am about to illustrate, a brief inspection of contemporary scholarship
indicates that no separate treatment is reserved for the question of what the question of
legal interpretation is. Cast at this level of abstraction, this issue is often portrayed as
merely inviting different proposals for paraphrasing what seems to be the same, more or
less, idea, namely, that legal interpretation is about identifying what the content of the law
is whatever thing this “legal content” is. Nevertheless, in the voluminous literature that
foregrounds the nature of legal interpretation there is at least a triad of what I am inclined
to see as metaphysically distinct suggestions or allusions—but certainly not fully
elaborated theses—about what a legal interpreter is supposed to ask when she engages in
this cognitive activity. This metaphysical triad directly corresponds to my exegetical
remarks about the triad of modes (objectual, agentive, effectual) the reader will encounter
in this collection.
For the sake of a very brief illustration and before continuing with my own
taxonomic proposal, I will take the intermediate step of associating this triad of modes of
interpretative inquiry with the ideas of three prominent analytical legal philosophers whose
work is cited at various points in the present collection. Further downstream, I will use this
brief exegetical digression as an informative background for introducing a reconstructive
taxonomy that re-articulates the objectual, agentive and effectual modes of interpretative
inquiry in a language that unmasks their metaphysical implications. In doing so I hope to
make a plausible case as to why these modes should not be treated simply as stylistic
devices for highlighting the uneven legal relevance of different aspects of linguistic
meaning but as “fragments” of metaphysically competing visions of how facts make law
which, in their turn, invite jurisprudentially irreconcilable accounts of legal interpretation.
Finally, I will supplement my taxonomic proposal with an illustration of how this
alternative taxonomy fares better than more traditional categorizations at measuring the
depth of the ongoing controversy over whether and how far normative considerations can
steer the activity of legal interpretation.
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A tacitly objectualist understanding of legal interpretation can be found in
Timothy Endicott’s suggestion that the question of legal interpretation is the meaning of a
certain kind of legally relevant object, that is, “a good interpretation depends on true
propositions that refer to the object” (Endicott 2012: 110).8 Beyond this overinclusive label
Endicott shoulders no explicit metaphysical commitments as to what it means for the target
of legal interpretation to be the meaning of an object, that is, of a cognitive (abstract)
artifact9 such as a statute, a constitution or an appellate decision. Discarding the realist
undertone that accompanies talk of abstract artifacts, Andrei Marmor highlights the virtues
of an inferentialist, speech-act-theoretic approach that anchors the question of legal
interpretation to what “the Law” or, equivalently, a properly designated legal authority
says, requires, asserts or stipulates in the context of a given enactment. Leaving aside
applicable nuances, the main focus here is a variant of speaker meaning which is a more
conventional expression for describing the function of the agentive mode of legal
interpretation.10 Finally, dispensing entirely with talk of legally meaningful objects or
speech acts, Mark Greenberg appears to favor a distinctly effectual understanding of legal
interpretanda. In his words, “legal interpretation is the process or activity of using legal
materials to ascertain what the law is, or, more precisely, to ascertain legal obligations,
powers, rights, privileges, and so on [emphasis added]” (Greenberg 2016: 2). The question
implied in this description is not what a legal artifact designates or what a speaker vested
with legal authority means but which assertions of deontic propositions of law can be made
true in a given jurisdiction by the normative effect of certain linguistic and other
institutional facts.11
Compressed as it may seem, this triad of modes of presenting the subject matter
of legal interpretation is not dispensable by way of even more abstract or jargon-free
paraphrasing because, as I will very briefly explain, a simple “scratch” on its surface
reveals three sharply distinct, underlying conceptions of the metaphysics of lawmaking
actions which supply the basic materials of legal interpretation. These accounts can be
respectively labeled “lawmaking as a mode of production,” “lawmaking as a mode of
performative expression (or achievement)” and “lawmaking as a normatively impactful
activity (or process).”
The first account (“lawmaking as production”) directly corresponds to the
objectual mode of talking about the object of legal interpretation and is perhaps the most
metaphysically demanding in the sense that it rests on a stratified approach to ontology.
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Asking what the legal meaning of an abstract object is necessarily implies a commitment
to a type of mind-dependent (intended) or mind-independent (normative or essential)
function served by the products of lawmaking actions.12 The products of lawmaking are
“laws” understood as abstract, institutionalized, cognitive artifacts which are not identical
to but supervene on their material (inscriptions) or abstract (text-types) bases. Cognitive
artifacts—to use Donald Norman’s pithy definition—“maintain, display, or operate upon
information in order to serve a representational [emphasis added] function and…affect
human cognitive performance.”13 All cognitive artifacts are usable on the basis of the type
of information they carry. A map, for example, is used to navigate because the information
it encapsulates can be used to perform a specific cognitive function (navigation). In the
legal case laws can be modelled as representational artifacts whose mode of representing
the world is symbolic,14 that is, they feature the use of natural language to impart legally
relevant information. In this case, identifying the content of the law amounts to specifying
the legally relevant cognitive function—for instance, the rational guidance of conduct—
served by the “use” of particular legal cognitive artifacts such as statutes, constitutions and
appellate decisions. The epistemology of the cognitive significance of legal artifacts will
crucially depend on the tenability of a metaphysical theory of law that determines the
properties that cluster together to compose such artifacts. 15
An alternative path which is directly associated with the agentive mode of
interpretative discourse is illuminated by the promising advances in speech act theory.
Instead of shouldering a commitment to the metaphysical, so to speak, output of certain
actions we may choose to inquire directly into what certain actors count as performing in
a certain context.16 In other words, we proceed to ask what an authority-bearing speaker
means by way of uttering a string of words that composes a text which is then subject to
promulgation as law. Asking what an individual or group of individuals vested with
lawmaking authority means by uttering a sentence X on a given occasion invites an
inferential inquiry into the mental states (intentions, beliefs) that actually17 or
counterfactually (ideally)18 explain the occurrence of a lawmaking event. In this case the
content of the law is treated as identical with the content of an authoritative intention which,
depending on the parameters of one’s favored theory, is actually or counterfactually and
individually or jointly attributable to certain persons or groups that qualify as bearers of
lawmaking authority.19 This is a typical speech-act-theoretic approach to lawmaking as it
locates the source of illocutionary content in the communicative intention that makes
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rationally intelligible a particular exercise of legal authority. In other words, a given
utterance qua event is also a way of performing a legislative speech act (an enactment)
which communicates the legal officials’ views on how those subject to their authority are
to behave.
Finally, asking which propositions of law can be truthfully asserted within a given
jurisdiction at a given time amounts to asking which facts (linguistic and other) about the
ongoing practices of lawmaking officials have the effect of generating the normative states
of affairs that make certain propositions of law and not others true.20 This case directly
corresponds to the effectual mode of discourse about the nature of legal interpretation. On
this approach to legal interpretation the way from semantics (sources of law) to ontology
(true propositions and their truthmakers) is anything but royal. Instead of being treated as
(part of the) contents of specific legal artifacts or legal utterances, they are taken to be the
contents of those actual or hypothetical assertions21 of legal officials, legal practitioners
and law-addressees which are apt to be made true by those normative states of affairs (or
facts) that obtain as a result of the lawmaking activities (or processes) that take place within
a given legal practice. On this picture the metaphysical question a legal interpreter should
ask is not what determines the legal meaning of certain legally authoritative cognitive
objects or mental states but the question of what makes certain assertions of legal duty or
right true. Some of the aspects of the activities—rather than the productive or illocutionary
actions—of lawmaking officials are taken to change the normative landscape in a way that
generates situations that bear the pertinent truthmaking relation to certain propositional
contents. Accordingly, the task of legal interpretation will be to ascertain the obtaining of
such truthmaking situations.22
The resulting division of opinion is, I would like to think, much sharper than the
picture

conveyed

by

“closer

to

the

surface”

distinctions

such

as

the

textualism/intentionalism/purposivism triad, the subjective and objective variants of
communicative content or the originalism/non-originalism divide. To illustrate the ambit
of this suppressed division of opinion it is worth casting a critical eye on the treatment that
is commonly reserved for considerations related to the separation of powers in the context
of statutory interpretation. 23 Theories of statutory interpretation do not only imply
descriptive theories of representative lawmaking, but also normative theories about how
the legislature should relate to the judiciary or the executive branch. More than that,
textualists, intentionalists, purposivists and game theorists all agree that courts should not
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exercise legislative power. In other words, all subscribe to a more or less rigid
understanding of legislative supremacy which, in turn, presupposes the construction of a
substantive constitutional theory of the separation of powers. Consequently, and without
losing its main thrust, a sizeable portion of interpretative disagreements about the
determinants of statutory content could be recast as a variant of normative political
disagreement about how the branches of government should relate to each other. Each
theory of statutory interpretation will invoke different aspects of linguistic meaning
(semantic content, communicative or illocutionary content, perlocutionary meaning, etc.)
as evincing the requisite fidelity to the ideal of legislative supremacy or, conversely, as
capable of weeding out improper instances of judicial lawmaking.
So far so good, one might exclaim. But appearances can be deceptive, or so I
would like to argue. Whereas it seems reasonable to accept that different aspects of
linguistic meaning can be marshaled in defense of different variants of legislative
supremacy, there remains a barrier to treating the resulting disagreement as normativepolitical all the way down. The relevant barrier is metaphysical in nature; it regards the
commitments each theory of statutory interpretation carries with respect to the
metaphysical question of how non-legal facts make legal facts. Without a prior account of
what individuates certain facts as apt for making law appeals to competing conceptions of
the division of epistemic labor among the branches cannot be conclusive. As a result, no
such theory can guard itself against objections from judicial activism if it omits to make
visible its metaphysical views on the nature of lawmaking actions. This is not a concern
that rival theories of interpretation literally ignore but, more often than not, they suppress
its urgency or direct relevance. Consequently, they appear to consent to the depiction of
their arguments and counterarguments as being informed solely by a combination of
linguistic and normative considerations.
It also bears noting that the controlling role of metaphysical argument in legal
interpretation does not entail that normative considerations alone cannot determine the
relevance of different determinants of legal content. Quite the contrary! It is
unobjectionable, I dare to believe, that normative considerations can themselves figure in
the controlling premises of a metaphysical argument. For instance, consider the case of a
textualist who takes legal interpretation to be the activity of figuring out what certain legal
artifacts individually or jointly mean. This position qualifies her as an objectualist about
lawmaking—that is, she believes that lawmaking actions are individuated by reference to
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the essential properties of the cognitive artifacts they produce.24 Within this metaphysical
framework she is licensed to argue that lawmaking is better understood as a productive
enterprise in the artifactual sense explicated above because an essential property of legal
artifacts is their origin in some procedure that is minimally recognizable as a form of
representative lawmaking. Accordingly, their procedural pedigree requires that they be
interpreted in a way that does justice to their function as instruments for reaching finality
in the resolution of immanent disagreement about what is just and permissibly enforceable
in a political community. With these premises at hand it could easily follow that, barring a
list of exceptional circumstances, a variant of sentence meaning might be the best candidate
for determining, in most cases, the content of the legal rules composing a particular statute.
My estimation is that such incidences make visible the indispensability of frequent
appeals to an interpretative theory’s metaphysical commitments. The specific questions we
ask in the context of a more targeted interpretative dispute can be more or less normatively
loaded but it is imperative for the intelligibility of our disagreement that they be transparent
to their metaphysical origins. In other words, we should be hesitant to proclaim the
felicitous or infelicitous conclusion of an episode of interpretative disagreement prior to
making sure that we have settled or, at least, significantly mitigated the more basic dispute
regarding the type of question we ask when we engage in legal interpretation. Are we
inquiring into the meaning of textual artifacts, the meaning of authoritative utterances or
the truth of assertions of deontic propositions about legal obligations, rights or powers?
These questions are anything but reducible to a common “ontological” ascendant and for
that reason it is advisable that they become more visible in a collective project that invites
a confrontation of interdisciplinary insights from the law/language interface.
By taking on board the first question we shoulder a commitment to a stratified
ontology of objects (material inscriptions, texts and laws) standing in relations of
consecutive constitution to each other.25 Accordingly, we must be ready to account for
what makes it the case that an abstract entity equipped with a normative function springs
into existence in virtue of representing certain texts as endowed with some specific
characteristics. By taking on board the second question we shoulder a commitment to a
category of reasons for action that derive their force from the performance of certain speech
acts that qualify as a proper exercise of a type of practical authority. In this scenario we
need to be ready to account for the rationality of guidance by a legal authority. In other
words, we need to explain what makes it the case that, under certain circumstances, the
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edicts of a legal authority provide a reason to treat them as settling the question of what to
do. By taking on board the third question we have already pledged commitment to the
normative nature of legal states of affairs. That is, we believe that there is a distinctly legal
class of normative propositions about obligations and rights that are made true by legal
normative states of affairs that obtain as a result of the activities of lawmaking institutions.
On this view, legal interpretation aims to identify the normative difference that the
activities of lawmakers make to what we may truthfully assert about our legal duties and
rights.
1.

NOTES
For the jurisprudential relevance of this distinction, see Marmor (2014: 28–34).

2.

The interpretation-construction distinction reentered general legal theory in the
context of debates over constitutional practice thanks to the work of what are
sometimes called the “New Originalists.” See Whittington (1999) and Barnett (2004).

3.

By “legal considerations” I mean to refer to the more specific considerations
emanating from the values associated with the idea of the rule of law.

4.

Mark Greenberg voices the same concern when he notes that “because legal
interpretation seeks to ascertain the content of the law, a method of legal interpretation
is correct if it accurately identifies the legal facts. Given this point, it is but a short step
to recognize that the correct method of legal interpretation depends on how the content
of the law is determined. As noted above, legal facts are high-level facts, which obtain
in virtue of more basic facts. In general, in such high-level domains, the correct method
of ascertaining the high-level facts will depend on how the more fundamental facts
make it the case that the high-level facts obtain” (Greenberg 2017: 110–11). Whereas
I do concur with Greenberg that a theory of legal interpretation must carry its
metaphysical commitments “on its sleeve,” I do not agree that everyone else should or
would agree that the question of legal interpretation is the ascertainment of the truth
of normative propositions about the obtaining of legal obligations and rights. As I will
try to show in the remainder of this note, not all legal philosophers tie their theories of
legal interpretation so closely to the identification of robust normative states of affairs.

5.

It bears noting that Solum’s hybrid variant of original meaning as both objectual and
agentive rests on a further distinction between the communicative, original meaning
or content of a constitutional text that judges recover by means of interpretation in the
strict, descriptive sense and the legal effect or content of the same text as the latter is
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derived by engaging in the normative, creative process of constitutional construction
(142). The original meaning of a constitutional text is eo ipso constitutive of its legal
content only when and because the originalist principle of constraint ought to be
applied to a particular case.
6.

The reason I am inclined to take the infrequency of this mode to be unsurprising is
two-fold. First, to this day, the most metaphysically concise as well as jurisprudentially
distinct account of legal interpretation as the activity of discovering the normative
effect or impact of linguistic and other social facts is owed to the still developing
research of a single analytical legal philosopher. Mark Greenberg’s “Moral Impact
Theory of Law” remains the basic source of reference for treating this mode of talking
about the nature of legal interpretation as a distinct variant. That being said, there is
room for arguing that the normative impact of linguistic facts is not conceptually
distant from the more traditional purposivist and pragmatist elaboration of the
“perlocutionary effect” of legislative utterances, namely, the change in the law that a
legislature intends to achieve by enacting a given statute. I remain timid to stretch this
correlation beyond the surface similarity between impact and effect mainly because
Greenberg’s theory is committedly normative and metaphysically realist, whereas
standard appeals to the purposive nature of legal interpretation terminate at the
descriptive claim that the inference of the ratio legis or purpose of an enactment is
ultimately based on descriptive facts about the actual or counterfactual
perlocutionary—as opposed to the illocutionary or communicative—intentions of
lawmaking officials.

7.

For Mark Greenberg’s specification of the effectual or impact-centered approach to
legal interpretation see infra note 20.

8.

As Endicott remarks, “[i]t is quite true that all understanding of communications
requires a grasp of context, as well as a grasp of the language being used. The word
‘interpretation’ is certainly flexible enough that you might, if you wish, signal this fact
about the understanding of communication by saying that all understanding requires
interpretation. Yet sometimes, gaining an understanding requires a creative intellectual
process of finding reasons for an answer to a question (which might have been
answered differently) as to the meaning of the object [emphasis added]. Some
understanding does not require that process. The distinction is well signaled by using
the term ‘interpretation’ for that process” (Endicott 2012: 121).
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9.

For a general note on the metaphysics of linguistic and other types of cognitive artifact,
see Heersmink (2016).

10. Marmor lucidly describes this view as follows: “the content that was successfully
asserted by the legislature is the legal content of the act; there is no gap between the
content asserted by the legislature and the legal content of the act. What the law says
[emphasis added] is what the law is” (Marmor 2014, supra note 1, at 12).
11. Greenberg notes that his formulation of the basic question of legal interpretation
dispenses with conflating the ascertainment of the linguistic meaning of certain
sources of legal content (statutes, constitutions, etc.) with the ascertainment of the
contribution that these sources make to the content of the law. In his words, “the term
‘legal interpretation’ is often used in a way that is ambiguous between ascertaining the
meaning of legal texts and using the relevant texts to ascertain what the law is.
Theorists often slip back and forth between these two usages. For example, it is
ubiquitous in discussions of constitutional interpretation to talk about ‘the meaning’
of the Constitution or of a constitutional provision. It is often left unclear whether the
question is the meaning of the words of the provision or the provision's contribution
to the content of the law” (Greenberg 2017, supra note 4, at 107). In a somewhat
similar spirit but from a different jurisprudential viewpoint, Lawrence Solum alerts us
to the importance of distinguishing the interpretative process of recovering the
linguistic meaning of certain legal texts from the constructive process of identifying
the legal effect (or legal content) of these texts (see Solum 2010). I do not intend to
challenge the cogency of these distinctions with which I generally concur. I do,
however, believe that they fall short of “hitting” their main target, namely, to render
void the license to make direct appeals to the “legal meaning” of texts or authoritative
utterances. In other words, I believe that it remains permissible for a legal theorist to
argue that what she takes the legal contribution, legal effect or legal content of a
certain text or utterance to be just is the meaning of a certain object construed as a
cognitive artifact or the meaning of an utterance endowed with the performative force
of a legal directive or declaration. In other words, nothing in principle and in advance
of further metaphysical argument, prevents someone from denying that the content of
the law is the normative content of certain free-standing, publicly assertible, deontic
propositions whose truthmakers are not descriptive facts about the existence of
legislative artifacts or the performative force of legislative utterances but those states
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of affairs that obtain as an effect of their existence or force. On pain of stumbling on
the Humean is/ought gap objection, the truthmakers of such normative propositions
must also be normative. Accordingly, invoking the centrality to legal interpretation of
these normative propositions for the sake of closing the gap between the purported
normativity of legal facts and the social practices on which the latter rest is a move
that can be resisted as question-begging.
12. Roman Ingarden develops the idea that public artifacts are partly individuated by what
is considered as a proper instance of their use. He notes, “[w]ith a piece of cloth, for
example, we clean pots. To the flag we render military honors; we preserve it, often
for centuries, as a remembrance, even though the cloth of the flag is badly damaged
and without any value” (Ingarden 1989: 260). In a similar vein, Amie Thomasson
suggests that “what seems most basic in many cases is the intention that the creation
be subject to certain norms, in the sense that it be recognizable as something that is to
be treated, used, or regarded, in some ways rather than others…It is the intended
normative features (that the object be subject to certain norms) that drive the intended
recognitional features…as well as many intended structural features”(Thomasson
2014: 51–52).
13. Norman (1991: 17). For a taxonomy of human-made, physical or abstract objects that
functionally contribute to performing a cognitive task (cognitive artifacts), see
Heersmink (2013). Crucially, Heersmink includes in his taxonomy nonrepresentational artifacts which “contain information-structures as [rather than
about] the world (i.e., ecological information)” (ibid., 472).
14. Alternative modes of representation include icons which are pictorially isomorphic to
what they represent (e.g., a map or a graph) and indices which causally interact with
the object they represent (e.g., a thermometer or a compass). See Heersmink (2013:
473–74).
15. Kenneth Ehrenberg’s artifactual theory of law provides a lucid example of an
objectualist approach to the determinants of legal content as it is premised on the
hypothesis that “[l]aws are artifacts in that they are specialized creations of human
intentionality that serve specific purposes and are designed in order to be recognized
as such” (Ehrenberg 2016: 175).
16. For the importance of registering the distinction between the agential and productive
aspect of mental states and speech acts, see Moltmann (2013).
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17. Subjective theories of communicative content take actual mental states to be the
constitutive determinants of speaker meaning. See, e.g., Grice (1989), Schiffer (1972),
Neale (2005), and Bach (2006).
18. Objective theories hold that the content that a speaker counts as having communicated
is determined by the inferences that a rational hearer, knowing the context and
conversational background, would be warranted in making about the speaker’s
communicative intentions. See, e.g., Goldsworthy (2005), Soames (2011), and
Marmor (2013).
19. Joseph Raz’s Sources Thesis is a refined specification of the ontological priority of
enactments to the artifacts they “produce.” The Sources Thesis regards both the
existence of laws as well as the determination of their content. It is the former
existential issue that regards the creation of sources of legal content through the
performance of authoritative directives. In Raz’s words, “A, being an agent who has
legal authority to make a law that p, legislates (i.e., makes it the law) that p (where p
is a variable for the statement of the content of the law) by performing an action which
expresses the intention that p become the law in virtue of that intention being
manifestly expressed” (Raz 2009: 283).
20. Two prominent jurisprudential theories that approach legal interpretation in
“truthmaking” terms are Ronald Dworkin’s interpretivist theory and Mark
Greenberg’s moral impact theory of law. Dworkin was widely praised and criticized
at the same time for his construal of theoretical disagreement about the content of the
law as being about the grounds of legal propositions. Being avowedly aversive to lofty
metaphysics, Dworkin refrained from providing a metaphysically circumscribed
account of these grounds and took them to be equivalent to further propositions “which
when true, make [emphasis added] a particular proposition of law true” (Dworkin
1986: 5). Being much friendlier to direct metaphysical argument, Greenberg has
explicitly associated the epistemological component of his theory with the
identification of the truthmakers of legal propositions. In presenting his vision of how
the epistemology of law should track its metaphysics, Greenberg notes: “the full
metaphysical explanation of the content of the law (of why certain legal propositions
are true) must appeal to value facts” (Greenberg 2004: 159). Accordingly, he takes the
central question that a full-fledged theory of legal content should ask to be “how can
a collection of facts about what various people did and said (including the facts about
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what they intended, believed, preferred, and hoped, and about what their words meant)
determine [emphasis added] which legal propositions are true?” (ibid., 173). For
Greenberg, making the law have or bear a certain content just is to make a legal
proposition—and its accompanying assertion—true in a given context. For the most
recent elaboration of his theory, see Greenberg (2014).
21. The choice of the speech act of assertion—rather than of a cognitive artifact or mental
state—as the primary vehicle of legal content is anything but random. Precisely
because assertion is a speech act that is commonly taken to be governed by the norm
of knowledge (“one may assert that p only if one knows that p”), the assertibility of
certain propositions of law is directly linked to the activity of legal interpretation,
namely, the epistemic task of acquiring knowledge of what the law requires. For a
general account of the epistemological background of assertion, see Goldberg (2015).
22. I believe that the prospect of this approach hinges, to a great extent, on the prospect of
the recently booming metaphysical and semantic project of truthmakers. Leaving
important nuances aside, the metaphysical component of this project is identified by
the claim that truth-bearers—that is, representational entities that most theorists
associate with propositions—bear a certain kind of relation of metaphysical (noncausal) dependence to truthmakers—that is, a certain type of worldly entity whose
identity is often associated with facts or, alternatively, states of affairs. For a seminal
defense of this component, see Armstrong (2004). The semantic component of the
same project (truthmaker semantics) adds the further claim that representational
contents are individuated by those facts (or states of affairs) that make these contents
true. There are two principal accounts of truthmaker semantics, one developed by
Yablo (2014) and Yablo (n.d.). The other account has been developed by Kit Fine in
a series of papers; see, particularly, Fine (2017a) and (2017b).
23. For an overview of the interpretative relevance of these institutional considerations,
see Nourse (2011).
24. Although some abstract artifacts have temporal or locational properties such as time
of creation or jurisdictional scope (in the case of laws), abstract artifacts lack
spatiotemporal location but at the same time they do not partake in the eternal,
unalterable, modally robust entities inhabiting the Platonic universe, so to speak. In
this regard, they occupy middle ground with respect to both real, spatiotemporally
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individuated and ideal, timeless entities. On this mode of classification, see
Thomasson (2003: 139–40).
25. In defending his artifactual theory of law, Ehrenberg aptly remarks that the relation of
statutory artifacts to texts is not identity but rather constitution. He notes, “[l]aws and
legal systems are certainly abstract institutions in that they are not identical with the
people constituting the legal officials, the words written in books or scrolls of law
[emphasis added], or the geographic area of their jurisdiction” (Ehrenberg 2016, supra
note 15, at 170).
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